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I. Introduction
Professor Lyman Johnson is not the first, nor will he be the
last, legal scholar to analyze, conceptualize, and publicize his
insights about Delaware corporate law. But, among those who
have made invaluable and enduring contributions to that
important space, Lyman ranks among the highest, measured by
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what academics value: influencing the development of Delaware’s
corporate law. There is solid evidence of that influence, which
this article is intended to develop. Along the way, we pay tribute
to one of legal academia’s finest.
This Article proceeds in three Parts, linked together by the
concept of prophecy. The first will demonstrate the influence of
Lyman Johnson’s—we believe prophetic—efforts to maintain the
integrity of Delaware corporate law principles.1 Those include the
business judgment rule and its fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty; and also the proper separation of substantive fiduciary
duties and the standards by which observance of those duties
should be reviewed.2 The second part identifies Professor
Johnson’s galvanizing insights into the subject of officer fiduciary
duties, and the attention that those insights have engendered.3
The third and final part focuses on Professor Johnson’s policy
view that, consistent with its wealth-producing objective,
corporate law should also serve the welfare of society.4
II. Lyman Johnson’s Contribution to Doctrinal Sensibility
Although lawyers, judges, and professors may occupy
different positions on the legal spectrum, all would—or should—
agree upon the importance of doctrinal clarity and integrity.
Without it, lawyers could not advise clients with confidence how
best to conform their conduct to the law, judges could not
pronounce what the law commands in a way that makes sense to
the parties and the public, and academics would be unable to
discharge their role of bringing analytical predictability and
clarity to the overall endeavor. For business enterprise law in
particular, doctrinal coherence is highly consequential5 because of

1. Infra Part II.
2. Id.
3. Infra Part III.
4. Infra Part IV.
5. See Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24
DEL. J. CORP. L. 787, 789 (1999) [hereinafter Johnson, Rethinking Director Care]
(“Coherence in legal doctrine is an appealing idea, especially in areas plagued by
conceptual complexity.”).
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what is so often at stake—multi-billion dollar transactions that
have national economic impact.
Lyman Johnson’s contribution to the clarity and coherence of
Delaware corporate law doctrine finds its most eloquent and
enduring expression in three articles that he wrote almost two
decades ago: Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care,6 The
Modest Business Judgment Rule,7 and After Enron: Remembering
Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law.8 In his first two articles,
Professor Johnson persuasively advocated that on two bedrock
doctrinal issues, the business judgment standard of review and
the fiduciary duty of care, Delaware Supreme Court
jurisprudence had gone astray and needed a fundamental course
correction.9 In his third article, Professor Johnson raised the
question of whether the supposed conceptual distinction between
care and loyalty is as clear as widely believed and whether the
duty of loyalty should be more formally recognized as having, in
addition to its “non-betrayal aspect,” an “affirmative devotion
dimension.”10 Given the influential impact of these writings, it is
useful to retrace their ancestry and the insights that underlie
them, which to us resonate as strongly today as they did sixteen
years ago.

6. Id.
7. Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW.
625 (2000) [hereinafter Johnson, The Modest BJR].
8. Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in
Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson,
Remembering Loyalty].
9. See Johnson, Rethinking Director Care, supra note 5, at 832–33
(seeking a more generalized duty of care for directors to act with reasonable
prudence, even in the special category of cases where business judgment is
exercised); see also Johnson, The Modest BJR, supra note 7, at 651
[B]etween the two concepts [the duty of due care and the business
judgment rule], the business judgment rule should be the more
modest construct; that it, not due care, is the better choice to “freeze,”
leaving due care with its concise, but fluid, “reasonable” and
“prudent” elements as the superior candidate for remaining what it
should be—a highly adaptive precept in the hands of common law and
equity judges.
10. See Johnson, Remembering Loyalty, supra note 8, at 30 (articulating
the different meanings of loyalty within the corporate law context and the
intersectionality of loyalty and care).
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The casus belli was a Delaware Supreme Court decision
handed down in 1993: Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.11 There,
Technicolor, a Delaware corporation, was acquired by
MacAndrews & Forbes, Inc. (MAF) in a negotiated two-step
transaction for a price of $23 per share, the first step being a
tender offer and the second being a cash-out merger.12 The
plaintiff shareholders initially filed an appraisal action in the
Court of Chancery against Technicolor.13 They later brought a
plenary breach of fiduciary duty class action against Technicolor,
its directors, and MAF, claiming (among other things) that the
second step merger was not entirely fair to the minority (nonMAF) shareholders.14
In the fiduciary duty action, former Chancellor Allen made
what the Delaware Supreme Court later described as “presumed
findings”15 that the Technicolor directors had failed “to reach an
informed decision in approving the sale of the company.”16 The
Supreme Court described that finding as “presumed,” because the
Chancellor had found it unnecessary to make that finding
formally since, despite the Court’s “grave doubts”17 about whether
the directors had acted with due care in deciding to approve the
transaction, the plaintiffs had not proved that the directors’
conduct had caused the shareholders any injury.18 The reason
was that the $23 deal price exceeded the $21 per share “fair
value” that the Court of Chancery had previously determined in
the earlier companion appraisal action.19 Applying the traditional
11. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
12. See id. at 349 (discussing the relevant transactions and merger leading
to the case at issue).
13. See id. at 349 (stating the pertinent procedural history, beginning with
the appraisal action and personal liability action).
14. See id. at 349–50 (explaining Cinerama’s dissent from the second stage
merger in conjunction with the plaintiff’s additional claims).
15. See id. at 370–71 (“We adopt, as clearly supported by the record, the
Chancellor’s presumed findings of the directors’ failure to reach an informed
decision in approving the sale of the company.”).
16. Id. at 369–70.
17. Id. at 358.
18. See id. at 370 (“[T]he Court of Chancery concluded that Cinerama was
not entitled to relief because it had failed to present evidence of injury caused by
the defendants’ negligence.”).
19. See id. at 350 (“By unreported decision . . . dated October 19, 1990, the
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tort principle of “no harm no foul,” and the teaching of cases such
as Barnes v. Andrews,20 the Chancellor concluded that the
Technicolor directors were not liable because their conduct had
caused no harm to the shareholders.21
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that
the trial court had employed an incorrect mode of analysis.22
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the business judgment
rule, not the common law of torts, was the proper framework
within which to analyze both the fiduciary duties owed by
corporate directors in the transactional setting, and the
standards for reviewing claims that those duties were breached:
To rebut the [business judgment] rule, a shareholder plaintiff
assumes the burden of providing evidence that directors, in
reaching their challenged decisions, breached any one of the
triads of their fiduciary duty—good faith, loyalty or due
care . . . . If a shareholder plaintiff fails to meet this
evidentiary burden, the business judgment rule attaches to
protect corporate officers and directors and the decisions they
make, and our courts will not second-guess their business
judgments . . . . If the rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the
defendant directors, the proponents of the challenged
transaction, to prove to the trier of fact the “entire fairness” of
the transaction to the shareholder plaintiff.23

Insofar as the Supreme Court ruling addressed duty of care
claims, it turned the pre-Technicolor law on its head.24 Before
Technicolor, if a plaintiff proved that directors failed to exercise
due care but the failure had caused no harm, the court would
apply traditional tort analysis and dismiss the claim.25 After
Chancellor found the fair value of the dissenting shareholders’ Technicolor stock
to be $21.60 per share, as of . . . the date of the merger.”).
20. 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
21. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 370 (Del. 1993)
(stating the Chancellor’s application of Barnes and the finding that Cinerama
was not entitled to relief for lack of evidence indicating injury to the
shareholders).
22. See id. at 370–71 (explaining how the Chancellor’s conclusion was
misguided and thus incorrect).
23. Id. at 361 (citing Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993)).
24. See id. at 371 (“In sum, we find the Court of Chancery to have
committed fundamental error in rewriting the Delaware business judgment
rule’s requirement of care.”).
25. See id. at 370 (“While Barnes may still be ‘good law,’ Barnes, a tort
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Technicolor, an adjudicated breach of the duty of care in those
circumstances would have a quite different effect, namely: (1) it
would shift the standard of review to entire fairness—the
standard traditionally reserved solely for determining whether a
director had violated his or her fiduciary duty of loyalty; and (2) it
would shift the burden of proving entire fairness to the
directors.26
That was revolutionary because no court had ever previously
held in a duty of care case that the directors must carry the
burden of establishing the entire fairness of a transaction that
they had approved.27 Because Professor Johnson believed that
Technicolor had confused fundamental precepts of American
corporate law, he embarked on a mission to untangle the
resulting doctrinal confusion that impacted the substance of the
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, as well as the relationship
between those duties and the standards of judicial review.
Because the above-cited three law review articles were the pillars
of that mission,28 we next discuss the contributions of those
articles to the development of Delaware corporate law.
A. Rethinking Due Care
In his first article, Rethinking Director Care, Professor
Johnson criticized Technicolor on numerous grounds, starting
with the Supreme Court’s failure to elaborate policy rationales for
action, does not control a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.”).
26. See id. at 361 (“Under the entire fairness standard of judicial review,
the defendant directors must establish to the court’s satisfaction that the
transaction was the product of both fair dealing and fair price.” (citing Nixon v.
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1992))).
27. See Johnson, The Modest BJR, supra note 7, at 642 (explaining the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision to employ the entire fairness standard in
relation to the court’s 1985 decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom).
28. See Johnson, Rethinking Director Care, supra note 5, at 789–90
(proposing a general director duty of entire care in Delaware to resolve the
unsettled law regarding the duty of corporate directors); Johnson, The Modest
BJR, supra note 7, at 625–26 (advocating a stronger duty of care and a more
modest formulation of the business judgment rule); Johnson, Remembering
Loyalty, supra note 8, at 30 (discussing the unclear nature of the duty of loyalty,
advocating a clearer structure to actually affect corporate doctrine and practice,
and coining the term “due loyalty”).
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reviewing care claims in the manner reserved for loyalty claims.29
The rationale for requiring entire fairness review in the loyalty
context is that the directors by definition are conflicted, and
therefore are presumed not to be acting in the interests of the
shareholders that they have a fiduciary duty to protect.30 There
being no one to protect the shareholders’ interest, the Court
becomes by default their only safeguard.31 To discharge that
function, the Court must use the most stringent weapon available
to it—imposing the entire fairness standard of review upon the
fiduciaries.32 Importantly, however, there is no such presumption
of adversity where directors are not conflicted, even though they
may have acted without due care.33 Accordingly, Professor
Johnson urged, no adverse interest presumption should be
triggered, for which reason Technicolor was flawed because it did
not recognize, let alone address, the basic underlying policy
difference between these quite distinct fiduciary duties and why
they are reviewed by different standards.34
29. See Johnson, Rethinking Director Care, supra note 5, at 801.
The failure by the Cede court to elaborate policy rationales for
stringently reviewing care claims in the manner of loyalty claims may
simply be because adjudicated breaches of the duty of care have been
so rare in Delaware that the courts have had little occasion to develop
more nuanced standards for addressing them.
30. See id. at 819 (“A director—who may receive little of the financial
payoff from undertaking a risk project—will be more risk averse than
shareholders may rationally desire . . . .”).
31. See id. at 809 (explaining that a director may act with care without
acting out of care for the shareholders’ interests and thus requiring court
supervision).
32. See id. at 792 (“Under the entire fairness standard of review . . . the
court itself must be satisfied as to the entire fairness of a challenged
transaction. Understandably, this stringent review standard is the standard
most desired by plaintiffs.”).
33. See id. at 801 (“Director carelessness does not doctrinally, logically, or
policy-wise, necessitate that a burden of proof shift to the defendants
accompanied by close scrutiny of the quality or merits of a business decision.”
(citing Murphy v. Wakelee, 721 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Conn. 1998) (rejecting the
claim that proving negligence in a fiduciary’s administration of an estate would
shift to the fiduciary the burden to prove fairness and holding that this burden
shift would necessitate a prior showing of fraud, self-dealing, or conflict of
interest))).
34. See id. at 799
[N]one of the authority cited in either Cede II or Cede III supports the
novel proposition that, in a duty of care case, a director must carry
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A second criticism leveled by Professor Johnson was that
Technicolor’s “quest for rhetorical [doctrinal] coherence” is
unworkable because “the business judgment rule is ill-equipped
to serve as the umbrella concept for analytically linking director
duties (care, loyalty, and good faith) with standards of judicial
review.”35 The duties of care and loyalty govern corporate
directors whether or not the directors make a business decision,
but the business judgment review standard applies only in cases
where directors actually make such a decision.36 To make the
narrow business judgment standard the framework for unifying
the judicial analysis of fiduciary conduct, and in particular the
duty of care, “will either be to mistakenly contract the pervasive
duty of care to fit the business judgment rule framework, or
eventually to regard the new framework as considerably lessencompassing than might initially appear.”37
Professor Johnson reserved his most trenchant criticism of
Technicolor for its misconception and treatment of the fiduciary
duty of care. First, he argued, the Delaware Supreme Court
“[faultily equated] a director’s informedness with a director’s duty
of care (thereby not grasping the genuine fullness of a due care
inquiry).”38 The duty of care, he explained, is far broader, and
includes not only the element of being informed, but also “the
larger process of directors subsequently acting with ‘requisite
care in the discharge of their duties.’”39 By improperly
formulating due care, Professor Johnson urged, the Technicolor
the burden of proving the entire fairness of a challenged
transaction . . . . [T]he Delaware Supreme Court decisions cited in
Cede II to support the proposition that in a duty of care case the
defendant directors have the burden of proving the entire fairness of
a transaction, all involved director self-interest, thus . . . implicating
loyalty and not merely care.
35. Id. at 802.
36. See id. (“Both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty govern corporate
directors whether or not directors make business decisions, while the business
judgment rule applies only when directors do make such decisions.”).
37. Id. at 803. Professor Johnson cites, as one example, the case where a
duty of care breach results from faulty director monitoring (a Caremark claim).
Such a claim does not fit into a formulation “that analytically subsumes the
richer duty of care under the important but more confined business judgment
rubric.” Id.
38. Id. at 801.
39. Id. at 806 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
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court shrunk the duty and deprived it of its proper place in
corporate jurisprudence.40 Therefore, he argued, the Delaware
courts need to “restor[e] due care as a meaningful cornerstone of
Delaware law” by requiring “the plaintiff (and the court) to
address not only the directors’ state of informedness, but also,
critically, whether directors acted with due care in light of that
information.”41 Rethinking Director Care then proceeded to
elaborate more finely the nature and proper application of the
duty of care concept, emphasizing that due care analysis should
focus on the soundness of the director decision-making
process42—not on the result—and, moreover, that even if that
process were deficient, no liability should attach unless the due
care violation is shown to have harmed the corporation or its
shareholders.43 In other words, Professor Johnson argued,
Chancellor Allen got it right in his Technicolor trial court opinion
that the Supreme Court later disapproved.44
Lastly, Professor Johnson circled back to the Technicolor
“burden shift and entire fairness approach to duty of care
breaches,” which “not only finds no doctrinal support . . . [but]
also cavalierly negates longstanding rationales for divergent
standards of judicial review in the care and loyalty areas.”45
Johnson reemphasized that
[c]are cases, unlike loyalty cases, do not deprive corporations
of ‘neutral decision-makers’ . . . . Consequently, a care breach,
contrary to what [Technicolor holds], should not result in a
judicial review of substance . . . . In the care setting, the proper
inquiry is whether an undoubtedly neutral decision-maker
acted in the proper manner; that inquiry does not ever
necessitate or warrant judicial inquiry into the substantive
40. See id. at 807 (calling for differentiation of being informed from the
notion of care itself in order to “avoid a wrong belief that the larger care analysis
is exhausted with the informedness inquiry under the business judgment rule”).
41. Id.
42. See id. at 814 (“The key judicial inquiry is the soundness of a board’s
overall decision-making process . . . .”).
43. See id. at 826 (“Damages may be nonexistent or limited if . . . as it turns
out, that little or no harm was caused by director carelessness.”).
44. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 370 (overruling Chancellor
Allen’s requirement of proving that the board’s gross negligence caused
monetary loss to Cinerama).
45. Johnson, Rethinking Director Care, supra note 5, at 824.
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merits of a decision, only into the process by which it was
made.46

B. The Modest Business Judgment Rule
In his second article, The Modest BJR, Professor Johnson
continued his critique of Technicolor, but focused more
specifically upon the business judgment rule itself.47 Here again,
Johnson argued, the Delaware courts, in Technicolor and other
cases, had improperly “formulate[d] the business judgment rule
and unsoundly [made] it the centerpiece of corporate fiduciary
analysis.”48 Although the duty of care and the business judgment
rule “oftentime seem hopelessly entangled,” they require
untangling for the sake of doctrinal clarity and good policy.49
[T]he business judgment rule is not usefully regarded as either
a substantive standard for affirmatively guiding judicial
review of director conduct, or a process-oriented standard for
guiding judicial review; and, finally, it is not at all designed for
fulfilling the task assigned in [Technicolor]—organizing
judicial fiduciary analysis into an overarching, seemingly
coherent framework.
Properly understood, the business judgment rule is simply a
policy of judicial non-review . . . . A more modest expression of
the sound statutory and policy bases underlying this judicial
deference to director decisions—as embodied in the business
judgment rule—is, therefore as follows:
“[W]here money damages or equitable relief is sought, the
business judgment rule is a judicial policy of not reviewing the
substantive merits of a board of directors’ business decision for
the purpose of determining whether directors breached or
fulfilled their duty of care.”50

46. Id. at 822–23.
47. See Johnson, The Modest BJR, supra note 7, at 625 (“The business
judgment rule . . . is better understood as a narrow-gauged policy of non-review
than as an overarching framework for affirmatively shaping judicial review of
fiduciary performance.”).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 650–51 (calling for distinction between the duty of due care
and the business judgment rule as a matter of good policy).
50. Id. at 628–31 (footnotes omitted).
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Professor Johnson argued that untangling the duty of care
from the business judgment rule is best accomplished by
refocusing on the original policy purpose of these distinct
corporate law concepts, and then reformulating and applying
those concepts consistent with that purpose.51 Thus, he reasoned:
If [a] plaintiff proves [that] a director did not act with due care,
whether from nonfeasance or misfeasance, that alone is a
breach of fiduciary duty and, absent statutory exoneration, he
or she should be held liable for all damages proximately
caused thereby. It is not the case, as [Technicolor] held, that a
proven breach of care somehow “overrides” the policy of nonreview embodied in the business judgment rule—a policy the
[Technicolor] court must regard as highly contingent—and
that the rule somehow “falls away” in [case of] a
breach . . . thereby freeing the judiciary to examine . . . the
substantive quality of a carelessly rendered business
decision.52

The fundamental conceptual error propagated by
Technicolor, Professor Johnson explained, was to conflate a
standard of conduct (the fiduciary duty of care) with a standard of
judicial review (the business judgment rule).53 The former
standard dictates what conduct is required of the fiduciary; the
latter prescribes how a court should go about determining
whether liability should attach for a breach of the standard of
conduct (if any there was).54 It is critical that courts distinguish
51. See id. at 651 (“[T]he duty of due care, in formulation and function,
should be differentiated from the single-focus policy expressed in the business
judgment rule.”).
52. Id. at 634. On this point, Professor Johnson concludes by adding:
The contrary [Technicolor] position, making the intensity of judicial
review toward the merits of the directors’ business judgment
contingent on whether directors fulfilled or breached the due care
duty, is unprecedented on doctrinal grounds, faulty on a policy basis,
and utterly counter to the deference embodied in a modest, but
consistently-applied, business judgment rule.
Id. at 635.
53. See id. at 651 (stating that the standard of conduct [the fiduciary duty
of care] is a pre-condition to the standard of review [the business judgment
rule]).
54. See id. at 647
Understanding the duty of care as a vital and independent duty of
directors, not merely a “component” of the [Technicolor] business
judgment rule, will led to breaches of that duty being treated as
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between these two concepts, for the reasons previously elaborated
in Professor Melvin A. Eisenberg’s classic article Professor
Johnson cited in The Modest BJR.55
C. Remembering Loyalty
Perhaps recognizing that a critical component had been left
out of his earlier critiques of the duty of care and the business
judgment rule as formulated by the Delaware courts, Professor
Johnson remedied the oversight in a third article, Remembering
Loyalty.56 There, Professor Johnson aimed his laser-like focus on
the overly narrow and incomplete expressions of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty, in both the Delaware court decisions and in the
scholarship of certain law and economics academics.57 Johnson’s
central thesis was that the duty of loyalty embraces more than
the negative requirement that directors, as fiduciaries, must
refrain from bringing their personal, economic interest into
conflict with, and from betraying, the interest of their stockholder
beneficiaries.58 Rather, loyalty also encompasses a moral element,
which he described as an “affirmative [duty] of devotion”59 to the
interests of those beneficiaries, even where the fiduciaries have
no conflicting financial or other economic self-interest. That
wrongs in and of themselves, not simply as triggers for effecting a
burden shift and a concomitant dropping of judicial inhibitions
against examining the merits of business decisions.
55. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 467 (1993)
[S]tandards of review, which govern liability and validity, are not
themselves standards of conduct. A director or officer who engages in
self-interested conduct without having dealt fairly has acted wrongly,
even though he is protected against liability by the relevant standard
of review. A director or officer who makes an unreasonable decision
has acted wrongly, even though he is protected against liability under
the business-judgment rule.
56. See Johnson, Remembering Loyalty, supra note 8.
57. See id. at 47–55 (criticizing the law and economics approach to
fiduciary duty judicial decision making).
58. See id. at 38 (differentiating between the concepts of maximum and
minimum conditions of loyalty by defining minimum condition as a negative
duty) (citing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY—AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF
RELATIONSHIPS 9 (1993)).
59. Id.
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broader component of devotedness, he explained, should be
formally recognized by the courts of Delaware.60 Professor
Johnson’s call for courts to broaden their articulation of fiduciary
loyalty (like his earlier call for courts to broaden their expression
of fiduciary care) was carefully supported by reasoned
arguments.61 Because two of those tropes turned out to be
prophetic, we summarize them here.
First, Professor Johnson acknowledged that the dividing line
between loyalty and care was less than sharp, and that “the
concept of care remains an integral part of corporate law through
the doctrine of loyalty . . . [and] is an attractive and
philosophically compelling position.”62 Nonetheless, he argued, to
conflate the two concepts would be “a dangerous strategy because
it risks a rhetorical obliteration of any conceptually sharp
boundary line between care and loyalty—two notions often
thought to occupy separate spheres.”63 As a strictly legal matter,
Johnson argued, judges must “differentiate loyalty from care for
the purpose of interpreting [8 Del. C.] section 102(b)(7) and
similar corporate statutes in other states.”64

60. See id. at 40–42 (detailing the extensive support for an affirmative duty
of loyalty and advocating for its adoption by the Delaware courts).
61. See id. (outlining various examples accepting the affirmative and
maximum condition of loyalty in corporate law discourse, including not only by
the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance, but by the
Delaware Supreme Court itself in Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. Ch. 1939)).
62. Id. at 32.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 42. As Johnson further explained,
Corporate law’s binary liability scheme . . . as manifested in section
102(b)(7) and similar statutes in other states, contemplates no such
ill-defined dividing line between the two duties. Supposedly,
Delaware law is clear in that directors face no personal liability for
breach of ‘care’ claims, only for breach of ‘loyalty’ claims.
Further elaborating the need for a bright line, Professor Johnson urged that
Courts . . . must say with greater precision what sort of director
conduct implicates loyalty (allowing damages) and what sort
implicates only care (prohibiting damages). Before enactment of
section 102(b)(7), it was enough to find a fiduciary breach of some
sort, at least for purposes of awarding damages, whether it was
grounded in care, loyalty, or both.
Id. at 58–59.
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Second, Remembering Loyalty recognized, although obliquely,
that the duty to act in “good faith,” although described in
Technicolor as a fiduciary duty separate and apart from the
duties of care and loyalty, is more properly regarded as an
element of the duty of loyalty.65 Reasoning from Chancellor
Allen’s insight in Caremark that “a sustained or systematic
failure of the board to exercise oversight . . . will establish the
lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability,”66
Professor Johnson presciently concluded that “a ‘sustained or
systematic failure’ of oversight is a failure to ‘take care of’ or
properly ‘care for’ the interests of the corporation and its
stockholders [and] [i]n this respect . . . is a breach of the
affirmative dimension of loyalty.”67
D. Lyman Johnson’s Contribution to Delaware Corporate Law
Doctrine
That Professor Johnson’s writing has profoundly affected
Delaware corporate law doctrine is a proposition that borders on
axiomatic. Not long after the aforementioned seminal articles
were published, then-Vice Chancellor (now Chief Justice) Leo E.
Strine, Jr. echoed Lyman Johnson’s criticism of Technicolor in In
re Gaylord Container Corp. Shareholders’ Litigation.68 There,
Vice Chancellor Strine, citing and quoting with approval The
Modest BJR, argued that it made little sense for Delaware courts
to employ the business judgment rule (“a policy of judicial nonreview”)69 as an overall principle of doctrinal unification.70
65. See id. at 69 (explaining that good faith is itself a requirement of the
director’s duty of loyalty) (citing In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig.,
753 A.2d 462, 475–76 n.41 (Del. Ch. 2000)).
66. In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch.
1996).
67. Johnson, Remembering Loyalty, supra note 8, at 46 n.112. As support
for his conclusion, Professor Johnson cited then-Vice Chancellor Strine’s
pronouncements to that effect in In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig.,
753 A.2d 462, 475–76, n.4 (Del. Ch. 2000) and Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43,
48–49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000).
68. 753 A.2d 462 (Del. Ch. 2000).
69. Id. at 475 n.39.
70. See id. at 477 n.46 (“[I]t might also be clearer to reformulate the Unocal
test so that it incorporates the concept of due deference to board judgment
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Focusing specifically upon the structural oddity of the Delaware
Supreme Court’s formulation of the Unocal standard of review,
the Vice Chancellor urged that Unocal should be a free-standing
test of the propriety of board defensive anti-takeover measures.71
But, under the current doctrinal formulation:
Unocal’s purpose and application have been cloaked in a
larger, rather ill-fitting doctrinal garment. Once the court
applies the Unocal test, its job is, as a technical matter, not
over. If, upon applying Unocal, the court finds that the
defendants have met their burden of demonstrating the
substantive reasonableness of their actions, the court must
then . . . reimpose on the plaintiffs the burden of showing “by a
preponderance of the evidence” that the business judgment
rule is inapplicable . . . . It is not at all apparent how a plaintiff
could meet this burden in a circumstance where the board met
its burden under Unocal. To the extent that the plaintiff has
persuasive evidence of disloyalty (for example, that the board
acted in a self-interested or bad-faith fashion), this would
fatally undercut the board’s Unocal showing. Similarly, it is
hard to see how a plaintiff could rebut the presumption of the
business judgment rule by demonstrating that the board acted
in a grossly careless manner in a circumstance where the
board had demonstrated that it had acted reasonably and
proportionately. Least of all could a plaintiff show that the
board’s actions lacked a rational business purpose . . . where
the board had already demonstrated that those actions were
reasonable, i.e., were rational.72

The Vice Chancellor’s criticisms were a precursor to a more
comprehensive doctrinal critique set forth in an article
co-authored by former Chancellor William T. Allen and then-Vice
Chancellors Jack B. Jacobs and Leo Strine and published one
year later in The Business Lawyer.73 From the article itself, it is
facially evident that it was influenced by Professor Johnson’s
articulated in Unocal and Unirtrin without confusing burden-shifting required
to tie everything to the business judgment and entire fairness standards.”).
71. See id. at 474–75 (“[T]he Unocal test is a straightforward analysis of
whether what a board did was reasonable.”).
72. Id. at 475–76.
73. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over
Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56
BUS. LAW. 1287 (2001) [hereinafter Allen et al., Function Over Form]. Professor
Hamermesh was actively involved the drafting of Function Over Form, having
provided helpful comments on the pre-publication draft.
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writings, which the authors cited liberally in advocating that
Delaware’s corporate law standards of review be rationalized and
simplified.74 Thus, the authors in Function Over Form argued
(among other things) that:
 There is no policy or practical reason for judicial assessment
of the substantive fairness of a board’s business, where the
claim is that the board breached its duty of care.75 In such
cases, “[a]ny claim that the duty was breached would be
reviewed under the gross negligence standard, and if a
breach of duty and resulting harm were found, then liability
would follow[;]”76 and that
 The attempted linkage of the business judgment,
intermediate “reasonableness,” and entire fairness review
standards is “analytically and functionally unnecessary.
Judicial review under Unocal/Unitrin should stand on its
own, ‘decoupled’ from ‘second step’ review under [the
business judgment or entire fairness] review standards.”77
Professor Johnson’s concepts of judicial review influenced
Delaware case law as well.78 In Brehm v. Eisner,79 the Delaware
Supreme Court echoed his cautionary observation that judicial
review of director due care is properly restricted to process, not
substance.80 As then-Chief Justice Veasey put it:
74. See id. at 864 (“In our view, a rigorous functional evaluation of existing
corporate law standards of review will clarify their application, reduce their
number, and facilitate the task of corporate advisors and courts.”).
75. See id. at 876 (“In the due care context, the plaintiff should be able to
identify whatever harm flowed from the neutral decision-makers’ alleged breach
of care, and thereby obviate any need for judicial assessment of the substantive
fairness of the board’s business decision.”).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 884.
78. See In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475
(Del. Ch. 2000) (citing Professor Johnson in support of the business judgment
rule and its purpose).
79. 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
80. See Johnson, The Modest BJR, supra note 7, at 631 (arguing that the
proper formulation of the business judgment rule is: “[W]here money damages
or equitable relief is sought, the business judgment rule is a judicial policy of not
reviewing the substantive merits of a board of directors’ business decision for
the purpose of determining whether directors breached or fulfilled their duty of
care.”); see also Johnson, Rethinking Director Care, supra note 5, at 825 (“The
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As for the plaintiffs’ contention that the directors failed to
exercise “substantive due care,” we should note that such a
concept is foreign to the business judgment rule. Courts do not
measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments. We do not
even decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due care in
the decisionmaking context is process due care only.81

Similarly influenced were the courts in the epic Disney82
litigation, which required the Delaware courts to explore the
relationship between the fiduciary duties of care, good faith and
loyalty, and to demarcate the boundary that separates them.83 In
his post-trial decision, then-Chancellor Chandler accurately
observed that Delaware case law up to that point was “far from
clear with respect to whether there is a separate fiduciary duty of
good faith” as distinguished from the duty of loyalty.84 On appeal
the Delaware Supreme Court, in affirming the Chancellor’s
decision and echoing Professor Johnson’s reasoning in
Remembering Loyalty, stated unambiguously that the duties of
care, loyalty and good faith, while perhaps similar from a
psychological or philosophical standpoint, must be conceptually
and legally separate and distinct.85 And although the Disney
Court did not address the issue—foreshadowed by Remembering
Loyalty and the decisions and articles described above—of
whether or not the duty of loyalty and the duty of good faith were
one and the same, that issue was addressed front and center later
that same year by the Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v.
Ritter.86 There, the Court determined that there was no separate,
substantive quality of any action whether taken or not—whether described as
‘rational,’ ‘reasonable,’ or ‘fair’—is not an issue in a care case because only the
manner of conduct is at issue.”).
81. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264.
82. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 760 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff’d. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
83. See id. (citing Remembering Loyalty and referring to Johnson’s
discussion therein of care, loyalty, and good faith).
84. Id. at 753.
85. See Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d
27, 65 n.104 (Del. 2006) (“Although the coexistence of both states of mind may
make them indistinguishable from a psychological standpoint, the fiduciary
duties that they cause the director to violate—care and good faith—are legally
separate and distinct.”).
86. See 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (“The failure to act in good faith
may result in liability because the requirement to act in good faith ‘is a
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freestanding duty of good faith, a breach of which could result in
liability. Rather, good faith is a “subsidiary element[,] i.e., a
condition, ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’”87 Thus, the Court
held:
[A]lthough good faith may be described colloquially as part of a
“triad” of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and
loyalty, the obligation to act in good faith does not establish an
independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as
the duties of care and loyalty. Only the latter two duties,
where violated, may directly result in liability, whereas a
failure to act in good faith may do so, but indirectly. 88

Lyman Johnson’s insights into fiduciary law and doctrine
were undoubtedly developed in solitude and were the product of a
scholar’s inner dialogue with himself. We doubt that Lyman,
being a quintessentially modest person, had any motive or reason
to anticipate that those insights would be as widely influential or
prophetic as they turned out to be. But they were, and in the
process he did himself, Washington and Lee University School of
Law, and the larger corporate community proud.
III. Lyman Johnson and the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate
Officers
Among the main subjects in Professor Johnson’s formidable
scholarly repertoire are the fiduciary duties of corporate officers
and the standards by which the courts are to judge whether
officers have fulfilled those duties.89 He has repeatedly striven to
elevate those duties in the consciousness of officers and those who

subsidiary element[,]’ i.e., a condition, ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’”
(quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003))).
87. Id. at 370.
88. Id.
89. See Johnson, Rethinking Director Care, supra note 5 (discussing the
appropriate standard of care within the business judgment rule); Johnson, The
Modest BJR, supra note 7 (exploring Delaware’s current standard under the
business judgment rule and directors’ fiduciary duty and proposing a separation
of the business judgment rule and the duty of due care); Johnson, Remembering
Loyalty, supra note 8 (separating directors’ duties of care and loyalty and
expanding on the latter duty and its importance in corporate governance).
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advise them.90 In so doing, Professor Johnson once again proved
himself prophetic: after years of uncertainty in which inferior
courts could only guess that officers owed fiduciary duties
equivalent to those owed by directors,91 the Delaware Supreme
Court, in 2009, finally so held explicitly.92
Professor Johnson’s work on the fiduciary duties of officers
has propagated a wave of scholarship that has undoubtedly
sensitized the Delaware courts to the issues surrounding that
subject.93 From examination of officers’ fiduciary duties
generally94 to inquiries into officers’ fiduciary duty of disclosure,95
90. See generally Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert Ricca, Reality Check on
Officer Liability, 67 BUS. LAW. 75 (2011) (differentiating between the fiduciary
duty obligations of corporate officers and directors and the need for a complete
development of the fiduciary duties of each); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert V.
Ricca, (Not) Advising Corporate Officers About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 663 (2007) (articulating the unsettled law concerning the
responsibilities of corporate officers need for said officers to understand their
fiduciary duties); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk: Model
Advice for Corporate Officers (And Other Senior Agents), 63 BUS. LAW. 147
(2007) (highlighting the lack of instruction regarding corporate officers’
fiduciary duty and proposing a model for lawyers to use when advising corporate
officers); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers
Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005) (criticizing the failure to
distinguish fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors and advocating a
separation to promote structure within corporate governance and to further
director-officer relations within public corporations); Lyman P.Q. Johnson,
Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439 (2005)
[hereinafter Johnson, Corporate Officers] (arguing that the business judgment
rule should not be extended to corporate officers in the same manner as it
applies to corporate directors and calling for closer judicial scrutiny of officer
conduct).
91. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 132,
at *14 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2004) (“To date, the fiduciary duties of officers have
been assumed to be identical to those of directors.”).
92. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (“In the past,
we have implied that officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties of officers are
the same as those of directors. We now explicitly so hold.”).
93. Infra notes 94–97.
94. See generally Amitai Aviram, Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and the Nature
of Corporate Organs, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 763 (2013); Deborah A. DeMott, Inside
the Corporate Veil: The Character and Consequences of Executives Duties, 19
AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 251, 252–54 (2006); Paul Graf, A Realistic Approach to Officer
Liability, 66 BUS. LAW. 315 (2011); Aaron D. Jones, Corporate Officer
Wrongdoing and the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers Under Delaware
Law, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 475 (2007); Megan W. Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement of
Corporate Officers’ Duties, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 271 (2014).
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officers’ duty of obedience,96 and the application to officers of the
business judgment rule,97 Professor Johnson’s work has been the
intellectual catalyst for much of the scholarly analysis generated
since he entered the field. And his work will remain an important
voice in the disposition of questions of Delaware corporate law
not yet resolved. As the Delaware Court of Chancery has noted:
The Delaware Supreme Court has not addressed the standard
of review that a court should use when evaluating officer
decision making. A lively debate exists regarding the degree to
which decisions by officers should be examined using the same
standards of review developed for directors.98

Professor Johnson’s contribution to making the debate about
the application of the business judgment rule to officer conduct
“lively” can hardly be overstated. Focusing on a relatively dated
practitioner article that drily reviewed the case law on the subject
and concluded that the business judgment rule does, in fact,
apply to officers, at least to a large extent,99 Professor Johnson
sharply questioned the precedential support for that position and,
more importantly, advanced a trenchant policy analysis of the
issue (prompting the practitioners to up their game and respond
more fully on a policy basis as well).100 As then-Vice Chancellor
95. See generally Z. Jill Barclift, Senior Corporate Officers and the Duty of
Candor: Do the CEO and CFO Have a Duty to Inform?, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 269,
270 (2006); Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems
of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187 (2003).
96. See generally Megan W. Shaner, Restoring the Balance of Power in
Corporate Management: Enforcing an Officer’s Duty of Obedience, 66 BUS. LAW.
27 (2010).
97. See generally Deborah H. DeMott, Corporate Officers as Agents, 74
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 813 (2017); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks
III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor
Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865 (2005).
98. Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 666 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2014) (citing
Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60
BUS. LAW. 439 (2005)); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III,
Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor
Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865 (2005)).
99. See A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law
Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 237 (1992) (“The
business judgment rule is almost universally applied to officers.”).
100. See Johnson, Corporate Officers, supra note 90, at 443 (“Existing
commentary does not make—or even attempt to make—a very compelling policy
case for extending the business judgment rule to officers but, instead, largely
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Strine noted in a 2010 opinion, “[t]here are important and
interesting questions about the extent to which officers and
employees should be more or less exposed to liability for breach of
fiduciary duty than corporate directors.”101 It is Professor
Johnson who deserves thanks for bringing out those “important
and interesting” policy questions.
IV. Lyman Johnson’s Contribution to the Proper Focus of
Corporate Purpose
Much ink has been spilled on the subject of corporate
purpose,102 but on this subject Lyman Johnson does not spill ink:
rather, he aims it precisely and pointedly, and usually hits his
target. In this section we pay our respects to instances where we
believe that Professor Johnson’s comments may have hit the
mark; but from our perspective as members of the Delaware
corporate law community, we note a respectful disagreement with
the prophet—a point on which, if past is prologue, we may well
end up being proven wrong about (or perhaps already have been).
At the risk of repeating what others are contributing to this
symposium,103 we begin our review of Professor Johnson’s
contribution to the analysis of corporate purpose by tracing the
recites case law. That case law, it turns out, is actually quite ‘sparse.’”).
101. Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *35 (Del.
Ch. July 12, 2010).
102. For notable entries in this debate, see generally KENT GREENFIELD, THE
FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 127–30 (2006); William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic
Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 265 (1992)
(“The corporation’s purpose is to advance the purposes of these [stockholderowners], and the function of directors, as agents of the owners, is faithfully to
advance the financial interests of the owners.”); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom
Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932); David
Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1993); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter,
Conservative Collision Course? The Tension Between Conservative Theory and
Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (2015); Lynn A. Stout, Bad And NotSo-Bad Arguments For Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002).
103. See generally Ronald J. Colombo, Religious Conceptions of Corporate
Purpose, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 813 (2017); Brett H. McDonnell, Between Sin
and Redemption: Duty, Purpose, and Regulation in Religious Corporations, 74
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043 (2017); Robert K. Vischer, Confident Pluralism in
Corporate Theory, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1179 (2017).
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development of his scholarship on that subject. We begin with his
2003 article urging a more robust view of the duty of loyalty,104 in
which he challenged the prevailing academic view that fiduciary
duties “have no moral footing,” and are merely “the same sort of
obligations, derived and enforced the same way, as other
contractual undertakings.”105 In that article, we see Professor
Johnson plead that “corporate law must decide whether the
director, to whom the duties of loyalty and care attach, is to be
regarded as a full-fledged, human, moral actor.”106 Reflecting his
belief that “judges can and should infuse fiduciary law with
widely-shared cultural norms,” that article “applauds” the
embrace of moral norms and rhetoric in defining the duty of
loyalty.107 Professor Johnson’s relatively expansive view of the
duty of loyalty found expression in Chancellor Chandler’s 2005
opinion in the Walt Disney/Ovitz stockholder litigation describing
the concept of “good faith” as requiring “not simply the duties of
care and loyalty . . . but all actions required by a true faithfulness
and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.”108
Three years after Remembering Loyalty appeared, Professor
Johnson developed a claim that pointed to extending the broader,
morally-centered conception of corporate law to all corporate
actors, not just directors.109 Citing the work of non-legal scholars,
Johnson noted a criticism of “shareholder primacy,” with its focus
“exclusively on a corporation’s financial return” to investors, as “a
104. See Johnson, Remembering Loyalty, supra note 8, at 72–73 (urging for a
renewed focus on the importance and necessity of the duty of loyalty in the
aftermath of the Enron scandal).
105. Id. at 47 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract
and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993)).
106. Id. at 48.
107. Id. at 53.
108. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). In the Chancery Court opinion, Chancellor
Chandler acknowledges the Court’s intellectual debt to Professor Johnson,
describing Remembering Loyalty as “about the richer historical and literary
understanding of loyalty and care, beyond their narrower ‘non-betrayal’ and
‘process’ uses in contemporary jurisprudence.” Id. at 760 n.487.
109. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory,
56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (arguing that “neither discourse within the
corporate institution itself nor within corporate law theory must be wholly
secular”).
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foundational good” that should nonetheless be considered only “as
a means to higher, more excellent goods, not an end in itself.”110
At the same time, he noted (and decried) the relative paucity of
corporate law scholarship that “examines the corporation from a
religious vantage point.”111 In this article Johnson advocated a
non-regulatory approach that “honors the reality of managerial
discretion by leaving to corporate decision-makers themselves,
and their legal counsel—not legislators—the task of deciding
whether and how to translate legal responsibilities into specific
courses of action based on religious belief.”112 As Professor
Johnson conceived it, a “faith-based conception of faithfulness”
would “allow managers to frame, and argue for, a redemptive
counterpoise” to the “prevailing discourse and norm of selfinterest” pervading corporate legal scholarship.113 A few years
later, in Re-Enchanting the Corporation,114 Professor Johnson
even more sharply articulated his beef with that “prevailing
discourse” in corporate law scholarship. His analysis in that piece
began with what surely is a modest but unassailable proposition:
“If religious faith—for some people—forms the very fiber and
foundation of who they are (their self-concept) and how they
interact with others (their relationships), we should expect faith
to influence behavior in the corporate world.”115 Professor
Johnson recognized, of course, that this unassailable proposition
still left open the question of whether and to what extent
corporate law—and its articulation of corporate purpose—permits
corporate actors to exercise their authority to conduct the
corporation’s business in order to promote that faith at the
expense of shareholder wealth maximization.116 In particular, he
recognized that “legal freedom necessarily is a critical predicate

110. Id. at 14–15.
111. Id. at 17.
112. Id. at 20.
113. Id. at 34.
114. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Re-Enchanting the Corporation, 1 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 83 (2010) [hereinafter Johnson, Re-Enchanting].
115. Id. at 90–91.
116. See id. at 96 (observing that companies vary in how they balance profitmotivated actions with other pursuits, such as the well-being of associates or
employees).
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to any call for more ethical and socially responsible conduct in the
private sector.”117
Does that “legal freedom” exist? To answer that question,
Lyman asserts—again, unassailably—that “humans both value
and reward cooperative behavior in others,” and that “[t]his more
well-rounded conception of people is at odds with standard,
oversimplified assumptions in neoclassical economic theory—
uncritically embedded in much corporate theory . . . .”118 We agree
wholeheartedly with that view, and with Lyman’s further point
that “there need not be a monistic model in a market system, as
opposed to a more pluralistic approach.”119 We also agree with his
approving citation of a 2009 papal encyclical urging that “there
must be room for commercial entities based on mutualist
principles and pursuing social ends to take root and express
themselves.”120
Professor Johnson reiterated these views even more clearly
in a 2013 article on the relatively new legal construct of benefit
corporations.121 Based on the view that “[m]any persons—
whether out of philosophical or religious convictions or other
beliefs—seek work (and a workplace) where meaning beyond
material gain for investors can be pursued and where vocation
puts principles into practice,”122 Lyman again urged that “as to
capital providers themselves, law should acknowledge the
possible heterogeneity of preferences rather than assume a
shared taste for ‘maximizing’ at all costs.”123 As Professor
Johnson explained, “there is no reason why, with respect to
business corporations, there cannot be a pluralism of marketoriented entities designed to advance different purposes.”124 We
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 100.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 96.
Id. (quoting Encyclical Letter Caritas in Veritate, LIBRERIA EDITRICE
VATICANA
(June
29,
2009),
http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedictxvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate.html
(last visited Mar. 23, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)).
121. Lyman P. Q. Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law
and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269 (2013) [hereinafter Johnson,
Pluralism in Corporate Form].
122. Id. at 280–81.
123. Id. at 281.
124. Id. at 280.
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agree with that claim, and with his proposition that benefit
corporation legislation—recently adopted in Delaware in
2013125—“usefully advances pluralism in corporate forms of
organization,” even if it remains to be seen whether and to what
extent investors embrace the benefit corporation form and benefit
corporations are able to effectively promote the public good.126
The benefit corporation’s ability to serve as a vehicle for investors
interested in promoting public goods moves us to support
legislation—particularly the Delaware public benefit corporation
statutes—that enables the creation of such vehicles.
So far, we are in lock step with Professor Johnson on the
utility of pluralism in corporate form, and with his aspiration
that the availability of divergent corporate forms will enable
investors and managers to effectuate motivations to serve the
public good and not merely the goal of wealth maximization. At
this point, however, we come to our parting of the ways with
Lyman’s views—a move we make with reluctance, given his
extraordinarily capable and deep analysis of the subject of
corporate purpose. We are from Delaware. And like most of our
fellow citizens who have written on this subject, either in judicial
opinions or published articles,127 we maintain that for an investor
who has not expressly manifested a contrary preference, the
purpose of the Delaware business corporation is maximization of
the wealth of its stockholders. We further maintain that this is at
125. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2013).
126. Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form, supra note 121, at 293–97.
127. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182 (Del. 1986) (“A board may have regard for various constituencies in
discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits
accruing to the stockholders.”); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16
A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (lauding craigslist, Inc. for desiring to serve a
community, but finding that as a for-profit Delaware corporation, the company
is bound by the duties to shareholders that accompany the corporate form);
Strine, supra note 102, at 351–352
[Conservative corporate theory] recognizes that the only thing that is
common to all stockholders who hold a pure long position in the
corporation should be a desire to see the corporation increase its
profits and stock price. . . . [W]hen the corporation begins to pursue as
an end other values, there is no rational reason to believe that the
stockholders are of one mind on those issues, and much less that they
invested to have the board of directors choose one perspective on the
matter to pursue with the corporation's funds.
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least the default rule, and earnestly doubt that this rule could be
changed even in the certificate of incorporation of a traditional
corporation. We take that position in part for reasons that
Professor Johnson acknowledges: “exclusively investor-oriented
goals are widely accepted due to deeply-ingrained business lore
and strong social norms . . . .”128 In light of that wide acceptance,
we find it compelling that a reasonable investor in shares of a
business corporation would expect it to be managed so as to
maximize shareholder profit, within the constraints of the law.
We therefore submit, as former Chancellor Chandler said in
eBay, that
[h]aving chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist
directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that
accompany that form. Those standards include acting to
promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders. The “Inc.” after the company name has to mean
at least that.129

We hasten, however, to avoid overstating our position. Professor
Johnson is right that the shareholder wealth maximization norm
is not codified in the Delaware General Corporation Law.130 Nor
is there a Delaware Supreme Court opinion, outside the sale of
the company context, enshrining that principle even as a default
rule, let alone a mandatory one.131 Lyman also rightly observed
that other states’ statutes (particularly the so-called “other
constituency” statutes) expressly establish a more pluralistic

128. Johnson, Re-Enchanting, supra note 114, at 90; see also Lyman P.Q.
Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 28
(2015) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby] (“[I]t
is likely safe to describe profit-maximizing behavior as a ‘norm’ or ‘common
practice’ in the corporate realm . . . . The profit maximization norm . . . is a
product of deep-seated business lore and practices, market pressures, and
professional education, not law.”).
129. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
130. See Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, supra note
128, at 10 (“Delaware corporate law, the most influential body of law for United
States publicly held corporations, does not mandate shareholder wealth
maximization. The statute says no such thing. There is virtually no judge-made
precedent to that effect.”).
131. See id. (asserting that there are no Delaware Supreme Court decisions
mandating shareholder wealth maximization, and citing the statute which
allows a corporation to be organized to pursue “any lawful business or purpose”).
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notion of corporate purpose,132 and that even traditional
Delaware corporations may engage in acts of corporate
selflessness, in the form of “reasonable” charitable
contributions.133 Indeed, the business judgment rule affords a
great deal of play in the joints that permits regard for the
interests of non-stockholder interests.134 And, just as
stockholders, by unanimous consent, can validate an action that
would otherwise constitute a waste of corporate assets,135 they
can, by unanimous consent, forego any claim that the corporation
should be managed for the sole purpose of maximizing
stockholder gain.136
Despite all that, we adhere to the view that the “deeplyingrained business lore and strong social norms”137 that, as
132. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 16 (1992) (discussing statutes
that “purport to expand the traditional view” that directors must make decisions
primarily to maximize shareholder wealth).
133. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2016) (granting corporations the
power to make donations for the public welfare); see also Kahn v. Sullivan, 594
A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991) (“[Section 122(9)] has been construed ‘to authorize any
reasonable corporate gift of a charitable or educational nature.’” (quoting
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969))).
134. See Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, supra note
128, at 11 n.69 (“When director decisions are reviewed under the business
judgment rule, this Court will not question rational judgments about how
promoting non-stockholder interests . . . ultimately promote stockholder value.”
(quoting eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch.
2010))).
135. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Bryan, 1978 Del. Ch. LEXIS 500, at *3 (Nov. 6,
1978) (“[A] waste of corporate assets is incapable of ratification without
unanimous stockholder consent.” (citing Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 605 (Del.
Ch. 1962))); Harwell Wells, The Life and Death of Corporate Waste, 74 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. [PAGE NUMBER] (2017) (“The property and funds of a
corporation . . . cannot be devoted to any use which is not in accordance with
their chartered purposes, except by unanimous consent.” (citing VICTOR
MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 399 (1886))).
136. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 36 (1991) (“[T]hose who came in at the beginning
consented, and those who came later bought stock [at a price that] reflected the
corporation's tempered commitment to a profit objective . . . then no one should
be allowed to object.”); see also David A. Wishnick, Corporate Purposes in a Free
Enterprise System: A Comment on eBay v. Newmark, 121 YALE L.J. 2405, 2412
(arguing that shareholders should be allowed to consent to forgo maximization
of shareholder profits).
137. Johnson, Re-Enchanting, supra note 114, at 99.
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Professor Johnson acknowledges, embrace the wealth
maximization principle require that a departure from that
principle be must sanctioned by stockholder consent. The form
that consent should take, however, is an intriguing question.138
Professors Johnson and Millon urge that the determination of
corporate purpose is simply part of the “business and affairs” of
the corporation and therefore is a matter that presumptively can
be established by the board of directors.139 In support of that
position, one could argue that stockholders inherently consent in
advance to such a determination: the governing statute invests
broad powers in the board of directors, so stockholders consent, at
the outset of their investment (the argument would run), to board
action to establish the purpose of the corporation.140 That,
however, is not our understanding of Delaware law: if the board
of directors enjoyed that kind of power to determine corporate
purpose, the Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon would not and
could not have rejected the board’s choice of a sale transaction
based on its choice to promote the interests of noteholders as well
as stockholders.141
Could the requisite consent to an alternate or supplemental
corporate purpose be manifested in a provision of the certificate
138. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law, 70 BUS. LAW.
161, 164–65 (2014) [hereinafter Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law]
(questioning the nature of shareholder consent in a situation involving boardadopted bylaws).
139. See Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, supra note
128, at 30 (“[U]nder standard corporate governance rules it is the board of
directors that charts a firm’s strategic direction. And the board is free to
advance the corporation’s mixed objectives over the objections of shareholders
and at the expense of strict shareholder primacy.”).
140. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 560 (Del.
2014) (finding that the enforceability of a facially valid bylaw may turn on the
circumstances of its enactment and use, but that if directors have been
empowered to enact bylaws, stockholders will be bound by those bylaws);
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 955 (Del. Ch.
2013) (upholding the facial validity of director-adopted bylaws imposing forum
selection and fee-shifting rules on all stockholders, based upon stockholders’
advance consent to charter provisions authorizing the board of directors to adopt
any bylaw within the broad subject matter purview of 8 Del. C. § 109(b)).
141. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
185 (finding that concern for various corporate constituencies is proper when
addressing a takeover threat, but that this principle is limited by the
requirement that there be some related benefit to the stockholders).
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of incorporation? Clearly such a provision would be legally
effective in a public benefit corporation.142 But would it be
effective in a traditional corporation even if adopted by a majority
of the shares over the objection of minority stockholders? Would it
be effective in a traditional corporation even if included in the
certificate of incorporation before the issuance of shares?
Although we believe that the answer is more likely to be
affirmative in the latter case,143 we are unable to express an
unqualified opinion on either question.144
And that uncertainty brings this subject to a close: it is in the
nature of a prophet to challenge conventional wisdom, which
Professor Johnson has repeatedly done, and with great
intellectual clarity. He and David Millon may well be regarded by
posterity as prophetic in their identification of an “ongoing shift
in the norms of corporate purpose to align with broad societal
expectations of corporate behavior.”145 The merits of that
aspirational norm are indisputable. What remains to be worked
out is the means by which that objective is to be achieved.

142. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (“[A] public benefit corporation shall
be managed in a manner that balances the stockholders’ pecuniary interests,
the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and
the public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of
incorporation.”).
143. See Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law, supra note 138, at 169
(noting that consent is more likely to be manifested where a charter provision is
in place prior to investment and is fully disclosed and readily understandable).
144. Indeed, that uncertainty may well have motivated the adoption of
public benefit corporation statutes.
145. Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, supra note 128,
at 25.

